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Jury misconduct or irregularity 
Dr Donna Spears is a Lecturer in 
Criminal Law at [he University of New 
South Wales and a barrister practising 
mainly in criminal law. She has a 
background in ins[itu[ional research 
and her current research imerests are in 
[he areas of criminal procedure and [he 
role of judicial discretion in sentencing. 
By Donna Spears 
The expression 'jury misconduct' 
is commonplace in American 
jurisprudence and covers a wide 
range of conduct from the juries 
having access to additional materials 
to the coercion of fellow jurors by 
violence. 
In Australia, courts have proceeded with more 
caution, avoiding the general term 'misconduct' 
and instead referring to all such events as 
'irregularities' unless the character of the 
juror conduct is such that the disapprobation 
'misconduct' is clearly justified. 
A basic principle of the Australian criminal 
justice system is that no person shall be 
convicted of a crime except after a fair trial 
according to law. One touchstone of a fair 
trial is an impartial trier of fact and, in the 
context of a trial by jury, that means a jury 
capable and willing to decide the case solely 
on the evidence properly before it. A trial is 
not necessarily unfair because it is less than 
perfect1 but it is unfair if it involves a risk of 
the accused being improperly convicted. The 
courts have stressed that the evaluation of 
such irregularities should proceed on the basis 
that jurors properly perform their tasks, are true 
to their oaths and comply with the directions 
of the trial judge, as to do otherwise would 
mean that there was no point in having criminal 
trials.2 
Critics of the jury system point to the potential 
of jury irregularities and misconduct to allow 
extraneous considerations to affect the jury's 
deliberations and thus impinge upon the right 
of the accused to a fair trial. They suggest that 
jury trials are inherently tinged with unfairness. 
This article looks at the types of irregularities 
that have been identified through the case law 
and examines the way in which the existing law 
and processes operate to ensure a fair trial. 
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Detecting and dealing with irregularity 
At the beginning of a criminal trial the jurors are 
instructed to make their decisions on the basis 
of the evidence alone and to set aside any 
prejudices. They are also told to bring to the 
judge's attention any instances of irregularity. 
Most documented instances are either 
observed by third parties to the jury (such as 
lawyers, the accused or sheriff's officers) or by 
jurors themselves. Jurors are often in the best 
position to detect misconduct or irregularity on 
the part of other jurors or in relation to incidents 
that affect the jury as a whole. The problem is 
that jury misconduct is often insidious-if jurors 
observe or participate in misconduct and then 
remain silent, such conduct may never come 
to light. Legal research can tell us much about 
reported instances of misconduct but it cannot 
identify individual instances (or the prevalence) 
of unreported misconduct. 
Once an allegation of misconduct is made 
during the course of a trial, the focus shifts 
to the conduct of the trial judge. A trial judge 
has power to take evidence in relation to the 




do nothing-on the basis that further 
mention of a minor irregularity will 
give it more significance than it 
actually warrants and itself may 
provoke or induce further problems; 
give clear and unambiguous 
directions to the jury to correct 
or remove the possibility of prejudice 
to a defendant; or 
discharge a juror or the whole jury 
if such a course is warranted in the 
interests of justice. 
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In deciding whether to discharge a juror for 
bias the test is whether the circumstances of 
the relevant incident would give a fair-minded 
obseNer a reasonable apprehension of a 
lack of impartiality on the part of the juror.3 In 
some jurisdictions, this is also the test for jury 
irregularity4 but in others a separate test has 
developed S Despite the variation in wording 
and emphasis, these tests appear to operate 
in much the same fashion with a basic concern 
as to whether the accused has been deprived 
of a fair trial resulting in a miscarriage of 
justice. 
Even if jurors do come forward, the 
identification of misbehaviour can be made 
more problematic by reason of the rule that 
courts will refuse to receive evidence from 
a juror about the course of deliberations in 
the jury room (sometimes referred to as the 
'jury secrecy' rule).6 This common law rule 
still exists, albeit in modified form, in many 
jurisdictions and is based on public policy 
considerations including the need to promote 
full and frank discussion among jurors, the 
need for finality of the verdict, the need to 
protect jurors from harassment, pressure, 
censure and reprisal and the need to maintain 
public confidence in juries.? American courts 
and jurists have also suggested that it 
reduces incentives for jury tampering.S The 
rule has a limited scope. It has been held to 
preclude proof of the subject matter of juror 
deliberations (such as a juror being racially 
prejudiced)9 but not proof of irregularity in 
proceedings extrinsic to the matters being 
deliberated on (such as material being given to 
a jury by mistake).1o 
Types of irregularity 
In order to understand how courts regulate jury 
irregularity it is useful to explore some of the 
actual situations raised in the case law. 
1. Juror contact or relationships with witnesses 
and other persons. Australian courts have taken 
a fairly robust view about casual or innocent 
conversations between jurors and other court 
personnel. A brief conversation between a juror 
and Crown counsel about the weather did not 
result in a retrial. 11 Nor did polite conversation 
between a juror and a judge's associate at 
a private party.12 The possession of mobile 
phones by jurors during deliberation did not 
justify the discharge of the jury.13 The giving 
of flowers to the mother of the deceased by 
a juror was held not to amount to evidence of 
either juror bias or misconduc!.14 However a 
conviction was quashed where a juror during 
a recess approached a detective and asked 
him questions about the identity of another 
detective who was a witness at the trial The 
possibility that the juror's question might have 
reflected an opinion about the reliability of the 
other detective as a witness based on prior 
information was enough.1S Likewise a sheriff's 
officer expressing his own view to the jury that 
the accused was guilty led to mistrial.16 
2. Unauthorised visits to crime scenes. There 
have been several reported instances of jurors 
visiting crime scenes outside court hours. A 
visit by several jurors to the general area of a 
hotel in Hobart referred to in evidence without 
any detailed measurements or timings was 
held not to warrant a new trial. 17 By way of 
contrast, a new trial was ordered where two 
jurors conducted their own viewing of an 
alleged rape scene for the apparent purpose of 
assessing for themselves the circumstances of 
complainant's identification of the accused.1s 
3. Unauthorised material or information present 
in the jury room. The main factor in assessing 
unauthorised material appears to be whether 
the irregularity is material, that is, whether it 
ultimately made a difference to the verdict 
returned. A book about guns in a murder trial 
where a gun was used was not held to be 
material because the information it contained 
was the same as that which was put in 
evidence during the trial. 19 A newspaper article 
about unsworn statements brought into the 
jury room by a juror in a trial where the two 
accused had made unsworn statements was 
held to be slightly material but too remote to 
justify a retrial. 2o The court suggested that a 
more appropriate course for the jury would 
have been to ask for specific directions from 
the trial judge. On the other hand, when pieces 
of paper containing extremely prejudicial 
material were inadvertently tendered inside a 
handbag owned by the deceased in a murder 
trial, a retrial was ordered because the material 
was capable of conveying information to the 
jury about the propensities of the accused.21 
Likewise, where prejudicial subpoenaed 
documents were given to the jury by mistake 
the conviction could not be sustained.22 
The courts have traditionally frowned on 
attempts by jurors to solicit information from 
sources outside the courtroom. The so-called 
digital age with its almost instantaneous 
public access to vast amounts of information 
via devices such as the internet and mobile 
b, Tile courts have 
traditionally frowned on 
attempts by jurors to 
solicit information from 
sources outside the 
courtroom. b, 
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6 Despite clear 
warnings, jurors do 
sometimes cross 
the evidentiary 
boundaries and go 
out investigating. 
Unlike the jurors 
of the past, jurors 
today know how to 
find out more. 6 
phones has provided more scope for such 
research. Jurors in a trial of an accused for 
the murder of his first wife discovered via the 
internet that he had previously been tried and 
convicted of the murder of the first wife and 
also that he had been charged and acquitted 
of the murder of his second wife.23 The 
irregularity as to the discovery of the charge 
of murder of the second wife was held to 
be potentially prejudicial as it risked the jury 
engaging in tendency and/or coincidence 
reasoning or risked raising bad character when 
that sort of evidence would have otherwise 
been inadmissible. 
Preventative measures 
In most jurisdictions the courts and the 
legislature have taken significant steps to 
prevent or at least reduce the potential 
for jury irregularities. Juries are now given 
strong and comprehensive directions at the 
commencement of a trial as to their duties 
and responsibilities. They ar~ also told about 
safeguards for the jury including the existence 
of specific offences such as jury tampering and 
contempt. They are warned not to undertake 
any independent investigations or use any 
material or research tool to access legal 
databases, earlier court decisions, and/or any 
other material relating to any matter ariSing 
in the trial. In two states, jurors are advised 
that it is an offence for a juror in a criminal 
trial to conduct independent research.24 They 
are also told that the reason that they are 
not permitted to make such inquiries is that 
to do so would change their role from that 
of impartial jurors to investigators, and lead 
them to take into account material that was not 
properly placed before them as evidence, of 
which those representing the Crown and the 
accused would be unaware and unable to test. 
They are warned that the consequences of 
such prohibited conduct may be that the jury 
is discharged or its verdict later overturned. 
In addition, most courts now exercise care in 
deciding which judgments to place on court 
web sites and provide to other legal publishers 
so as to minimise the opportunity for jurors 
to obtain information about persons currently 
facing trial. 
o Rdolill 1"lIe 00 2007 
Comment 
The role of jurors in criminal trials has been 
traditionally divided into two distinct but 
overlapping phases: in the first the evidence 
is adduced before them; and it is only in the 
second phase that they are asked to act, that 
is deliberate, and come to a verdict. Of course 
jurors can and increasingly do ask questions 
within the framework of the traditional trial 
but clearly sometimes that is not sufficient. 
Despite clear warnings, jurors do sometimes 
cross the evidentiary boundaries and go out 
investigating. Unlike the jurors of the past, 
jurors today know how to find out more. One 
important question that should be asked is 
why do they do it. Jurors are obviously not 
satisfied with the state of the evidence and 
want to know or find out more. There is nothing 
that can be inferred from any of the Australian 
cases (in part due to the exclusionary rule) to 
suggest the wayward jurors were deviating 
from their sworn task of determining the guilt 
or innocence of the accused. They all appear 
to be attempting to do their authorised work, 
albeit in an unauthorised mode. 
Psychologists have suggested that people 
need to believe the world is a just place 
in which individuals get what they deseNe 
and so they respond to wrongs by doing 
everything they can to procure an appropriate 
remedy.25 If this is correct, then jurors go out 
investigating in order to bring perpetrators 
to justice or equally to ensure that the 
innocent are not wrongfully convicted. They 
are sometimes simply not content to stay in 
the more passive role allocated to them. The 
other factor that may drive jurors to search for 
additional evidence, be it by research or other 
investigation, is a belief in the existence of 
other physical or scientific evidence capable 
of resolving particular factual issues. Some 
commentators have suggested that TV shows 
like CSt have fortified such beliefs, although 
this effect has been questioned.26 
Bearing this in mind, ihe courts themselves 
may have a role to play in alleviating 
juror frustration by improving the lines of 
communication between judge and jury. The 
stronger directions on irregularity that include 
reference to the possible prejudice to the 
parties and procedural consequences have 
been a move in the r!ght direction. I want to 
make a more radical suggestion-that judges 
might admit upfront to juries that sometimes 
things will be kept from them, not by 
.-------------------------------------------------~~------
incompetence, oversight or error, but because 
of rules of evidence that are there to ensure 
that justice is done. It can only further t~le 
course of justice for jurors to understand that 
the search for truth must not be pursued to the 
exclusion of all else. 
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